By Israel Galindo, Associate Dean for Lifelong Learning
In Toward a Theory of Instruction, educational theorist Jerome Bruner insists that a theory of development must be linked both to a theory of knowledge and to a theory of instruction, “or be doomed to triviality.” (Bruner p. 21)
I have long felt the lack of a linkage of theory to practice is partly the reason so much of what passes for Christian education is at best benign, and that at worst, it has a tendency to trivialize faith. Providing “interesting” learning experiences may provide enough impetus to keep people coming back to participate in church religious education for a while, but ultimately, there are more “interesting” things in the world to capture and hold our attention if entertainment is our vehicle for retaining people’s interest.
An effective Christian education program must (1) give rigorous attention to the developmental dynamics and processes of its subjects (learners), (2) hold to an epistemological philosophy of how learners learn (including an answer to the question, “how learners learn faith”), and (3) apply and practice a theory of learning related to how to teach, be it instruction, nurture, education, mentoring, etc.
Bruner suggests that mental growth “is in very considerable measure dependent on growth from the outside in—a mastering of [the ways] that are embodied in the culture and that are passed on in a contingent dialogue by agents of the culture.” (p. 21). He claims that this is the case when language and the symbolic systems of the culture are involved. Those three elements—language, symbolic systems, and culture—are foundational elements to spiritual and faith formation.
Does Bruner’s educational framework have something to say about how we go about faith development in the church? Perhaps it’s helpful to consider that while faith is a (universal) human potential, it is dependent on influences for growth from the outside in—a mastering of the ways the practices of faith are embodied in the faith community’s culture that are passed on, as Bruner says, “in a contingent dialogue by agents of the culture.” That strikes me as a more helpful and promising start at understanding how faith develops than fuzzy devotional notions, individualistic, or “magical thinking” related to how faith comes about and grows.
Further, Bruner’s statement that “much of the growth starts out by our turning around on our own traces and recoding in new forms, with the aid of adult tutors, what we have been doing or seeing, then going on to new modes of organization with the new products that have been formed by these recodings” (p. 21) suggests three things.